The Bazaar of Heracleides

The Possibilities of Theology - §1 The Being and Attributes of God. Eberhard Jüngel's dispute with the Classical Philosophical Tradition

2007-06-04T14:42:00.000+01:00

Colin Gunton

Jüngel as Philosophical Theologian?

The opening essay in the collection of essays edited by John Webster on the event of the sixtieth birthday of Eberhard Jüngel explores the extent of the philosophical interaction of Jüngel, but Jüngel as one who fits into the post-Barth theological milieu. Ultimately, the question is this: to what extent can Jüngel be considered a philosophical theologian? (or, in wording which Jüngel himself would prefer - a theologian who utilised philosophy as a means)

The first obstacle which must be faced is this - if the line is traced through Barth to Jüngel, and if Barth is 'widely believed, certainly in the Anglo-Saxon world, not to have a philosophical theology at all'(7), then the purpose of the essay is doomed from the outset. To this Gunton offers two arguments 1 - Barth interacts with philosophy (i.e. in arguing against natural theology) and, thus, it can be argued that Barth exhibited what is in some way a negative philosophical theology. However, secondly, Gunton suggests that Barth was more of a philosopher than is sometimes posited - thus, Jüngel can be seen as being a development of Barth in his more succesful approach to philosophy.

The area in which Gunton highlights Barth as philosopher is in his doctrine of divine attributes. Via the argumentation of Christoph Scwoebel (in God: Action and Revelation), he posits 'two apparently conflicting sources' for the divine attributes. Firstly, you have a complex of attributes which are drawn up in the idea that God is bound up in talk of God as 'necessary, immutable, uncaused, omnipotent, etc., etc.' (8) i.e. the language of Plato and Aristotle which forms the framework of Christian theology. On the other hand, there is the so-called 'moral' or 'personal' attributes of God, viz. the concept of divine action which is present in the biblical witness - love, freedom, mercy, righteousness, etc.

How are these two conflicting approaches brought together? Schwoebel argues that one cannot make an absolute choice between the two without an 'intellectual revolution'. Thus, for Gunton, by merit of his discussion of the attributes of God, Barth must be involving himself in some form of philosophical theology. "That is to say, in so far as he is concerned, in his treatment of the divine perfections, to interpret such language as he accepts from the philosophical tradition in the light of action-led theory of the attributes, he is involved in philosophical theology." (9)

Gunton moves on to talk about the doctrine of impassibility which is approached by Barth. I will not make any comments here as to the full discussion but will say:

1 - Impassibility is serious - it prevents a view that God 'can be pushed around'.
2 - However, the tradition does require critique - it is always a danger that Christian doctrine can become limited by a priori metaphyical commitments.
3 - Barth's revision of the tradition was made in the light of i) trinitarian (i.e. in the light of the triune revelation) ii) but also Christological pressures. This can be seen in the development of Jüngel as we see the crucifixion become linked strongly with the divinity of God.

Ontology without Metaphysics

As it is, Jüngel is not a repristination of Barth but offers a far more sophisticated philosophy than Barth ever did. (I am reminded here of Jüngel's work 'Meine Theologie' where he exclaims, "I believe, therefore I think. Faith gives itself to be thought. One cannot believe in God without thinking about him. (Theological Essays II, 9) Jüngel claims that, "Christian theology must, in working through the concept of God, carry through its business of thinking its concept of God far more seriously far more rigourously than philosphy has done." (Gott als Geheimnis der Welt, 269) In many ways Gottes Sein ist im Werden is Jüngel's attempt to show the philosophical roots of Barth's opposition to the anologia entis and the resulting categories of revelation conceived as trinity. Thus, Jüngel can point out that Barth's idea that revelation must commandeer language rather than vice-versa (Jüngel calls this Signifikationshermeneutik, (the meaning of words prescribes the meaning of things)GSW 18f) is touched on in Parmenides.

But more than this, Jüngel shows Barth to be in conflict with the ontology of classical thought as well as the approach to meaning. For Barth, God's being is to be understood relationally by means of the trinity. Furthermore, Christian theology is concerned to present the independent being of God. However, the problem is present in this: that if the concept of God is to be bound up with the traditional concepts of ousia then the metaphysical framework presented collapses. Aristotlean first substances are by definition non-relational. On the other hand, relational beings require some reciprocity and therefore cannot be first substances. What is the result - that God cannot be God without the existence of humanity. Jüngel is concerned to show how this dilemma can be thought through and explained by Barth's trinitarianism and that God's relation to the world can be real and unnecessitated. "Gracious personal action presupposes and requires a preceeding inner (immanent) freedom of God." (12)

Ultimately, Jüngel posits that a true understanding of Barth offers a view of the God-World relation through trinitarian revelation which, in turn, offers not only a critique to but also an alternative to a 'philosophical theology that appears to imprison God in eternity'.(12) Ontology can be talked about apart from metaphysics. Theological ontology must be driven by the second set of divine attributes viz. God must be understood via a concept of divine agent. However, it must be construed in terms which can be in continuity with classical metaphysics and the historical consequences therein. (This must be the case in Jüngel's work - the place given to classical metaphysical discussion is great)

Christology, Hegel and Divine Attributes

From here, Gunton has to approach the subject of the relation between God and the World. For Jüngel, we have seen how he would interpret Barth's conceptualisation between God and and the World, but for the majority of the critics who would broach this topic would work from the claim that Barth is too reliant upon Hegel. Ultimately, the Christology posited by the Hegelian view finds its roots in the Lutheran understanding of the communicatio idiomatum so that by the time it reaches Hegel, the distinction between divine and human natures is fudged, "the divine nature is the same as the human" (Hegel, Phenomenology of the Mind, 760). "The divine involvement in Christ becomes in different ways generalised, so that the locus of divine being as well as of action comes to be centred on forms of divine presence to and in the world" (14) In other words, the nuanced distinction that Jüngel made between the divine being and divine action is collapsed and so God's being is bound up not only in becoming but also in the other to which it becomes. Thus, the tendency of Hegelian philosophical theology is to bind too closely the being of God to the being of the world, viz. necessitarianism.

From here, Gunton can talk of the attempt of Jüngel (himself a Lutheran) to utilise Hegel so as to build an alternate doctrine of God to that posited by the classical tradition. This is best seen in Gott als Geheimnis der Welt (which bears the subtitle - On the Foundation of the Theology of the Crucified One in the Dispute between Theism and Atheism) where Jüngel begins by tracing the problem of atheism as being primarily a response to the Cartesian positing the necessity of God for the being of the world. Also, the philosophical tendency to place the omnipotence of God prior to his love led to an atheistic demand to deny God in the name of freedom.

What is it that underlies this tendency of philosophical theology? Gunton suggests that it is not merely the stressing of the necessity of God but the superceding of the contingent by the necessity. What then is needed is, "a kind of necessity which calls the being of the world into question; that is an idea of God as something mehr als notwendig" (17) Thus, God can be construed in terms where he is not metaphysically necessary to the world, viz. God is the one who is revealed through the miracle of revelation and recognised as the one who rescues from nothingness. It is in these terms that God's necessity and aseity are to be explored. Thus, Jüngel grounds his doctrines of necessity and aseity NOT in temrs of gracious and free action but in terms of the being of God as love. "Thus the traditional attributes of self-determination, omnipotence and transcendance are now construed on the basis of a theology of gracious personal action rather than on metaphysical necessity, and are accordingly transformed in their meaning." (17)

Herein lies Jüngel's development of Barth - he develops his postion via Luther. For Luther, although he falls foul of the metaphysical tendencies to necessity, his doctrine of communicatio idiomatum allows him to appreciate the real involvement of God in the death of Christ. This links back to Hegel and the modern positing of the 'death of God' theology cf. Moltmann etc. However, Jüngel is careful that this idea of the 'death of God' isn't seen as a cultural experience but that it is given real theological content. "Christianly understood, the theology of the death of God frees theology from metaphysics." (18) But how can this general identification of God with the world be understood in terms of the distinction between God and the world (cf. 'Meine Theologie' - I believe, therefore I differentiate)?

It is at this juncture that Jüngel utilises the notion of God as the mystery (musterion, Geheimnis) as he comes to the world. "In place of the God who is in heaven because he cannot be on earth there comes the Father who is in heaven in such a way that his heavenly kingdom can come into the world, that is, a God who is in heaven in such a way that he can identify himself with the poverty of the man Jesus, with the existence of one brought from life to death on the cross" (GGW, 284) Here we see Jüngel's radical critique of tradition and the idea that the cross of Jesus entails a major revision of the classical doctrine. However, he doesn't want to go down the same route as, say, Moltmann - "God is the one who can and does bear, can and does suffer, in his being the annihilating power of nothingness... without being annihilated by it." (GGW, 295)

Thus, God's being is not determined by his becoming, rather God's being is revealed by his coming and, in this revelation, is shown to be a mystery. Not in as much a mystery as we cannot know him (here Jüngel inserts a critique of the via negativa of John of D and Thomas) but because he is a mystery in his being.

Gunton goes on to ask a number of questions of this but the questions approach Jüngel's pneumatology (i.e. Augustinian 'bond of love' which is no doubt not good enough for Gunton)

Trevor Hart on Irenaeus...

2007-05-02T17:09:00.000+01:00

Reading today was based around revision for my module on soteriology and looking primarily today at Irenaeus. I read an article by Barth on Irenaeus idea of Salvation and doctrine of Recapitulation. It's logic went like this:

1 - Irenaeus has been view by Liberal Protestant scholars as affirming a simply 'Physical' view of redemption. He talks of aphtharsia and athanasia and seems to construct a model of salvation in terms of these metaphysical categories rather than in any moral categories i.e. sin, guilt, judgement, need of reconciliation, etc.
Take for example Adolf von Harnack who sees Irenaeus as pretty much flavouring his theology with quasi-Gnostic syncretism. Ultimately, to refute Gnosticism he dresses up the Christian Gospel in the guise of Gnosticism to win them over. Thus, for Harnack, the moral categories of sin, guilt, etc. fall out and we are left with Physical redemption.

2 - However, this cannot be the case because we have Irenaeus mixing language of aphtharsia and athansia with language of realtion i.e. there is some account of moral categories at work in Irenaeus theology. So what is going on? What is the problem?

3 - People like Harnack and Loofs are merely trying to squeeze Irenaeus into a procrustean bed of Greek metaphysics so that he is seen to mirror an ontological dualism. Resultingly, they have to discount any language of moral categories as vestiges of Irenaeus "moralism" or "eclecticism". (In thinking more on this after writing this post I think I've decided why it is that Harnack sees the metaphysical displacing the moral - for Harnack, the Physical Redemption is 'bare fact' - I mean by this that the redemptive act occurs in the womb of Mary in the union of the two natures - human and divine. If this is the case, then there is no need to talk about a moral aspect to salvation. Ultimately, Hart posits that Irenaeus ontology posits that the union between God and Man in Christ is a process which spans the whole of his earthly ministry and therefore he terms the union in more existential terms)

4 - The problem with this is that ontological dualism has no place for "existence" as Hart calls it but only essense (i.e. ontology). In other words, the relational language of koinonia between God and Man falls out of this ontology and is useless. Hart posits that rather than following this Greek metaphysical ordering, we should read Irenaeus language of relation and ontology together i.e. existence is in someway constitutive [sic] of ones ontology viz. our relations in some way make us what we are. Thus, a change in relation will result in a change of being and therefore, Irenaeus can think of the two categories as being closely linked.

All well and good but it seems to me that the anachronism which Hart seems so keen to pull up Harnack and co. on is repeated by him to a greater extent in his methodology. He uses terms which seem to me very reminiscent of an almost Barthian existentialist approach, something even more alien (so alien it didn't exist!) than the Gnostic neoplatonism that he accuses Harnack and co. of being bound by... I'm not saying I don't agree with his idea. Just that it seems as though he's in danger of going the opposite direction...

For WTM - a section from Jungel...

2007-05-01T09:22:00.001+01:00

Here's a section from Jungel where he more clearly expresses the idea that "God's Being is in becoming":

"The title of this book may be off-putting. However, I ask you to read it carefully. It is not a matter of the ‘God who becomes’. God's being is not identified with God’s becoming; rather, God’s being is ontologically located. [. . .]

Theologically, what we call ‘becoming’ should be understood in its fundamental ontology as a trinitarian category. According to this, God does not leave his present behind him as a past in order to proceed towards a future which is strange to him; rather, in his trinitarian livingness he is ‘undividedly the beginning, succession and end, all at once in His own essence’. And so the title of this book tries to indicate what might be called the axiom of the Christian doctrine of God. (xxv-xxvi)"

Foreword to the First Edition, God's Being is in Becoming, Eberhard Jungel.

Karl Barth's Soteriology

2007-04-30T12:57:00.000+01:00

In approaching the soteriology of Karl Barth it would be easy to reduce his thought into some dissolution or pihy abstraction. However, although he wasn't a systematican in the sense that he had no dogmatic 'centre' to his work, it is important to note that he was a systematician in the sense that all his work is written in the light of his wider corpus. Furthermore, throughout his lifetime, Barth sought to avoid any "abstraction" and so, for example, his doctrine of the Person of Christ is undeniably linked to his Doctrine of the Work of Christ. Also, reference will be made to his doctrine of revelation, Trinity, election, etc.

Integral to Barth's doctrine of soteriology, is the primary stress upon the decision of God to SAVE logically prior to the desire of God to CREATE. Thus, for Barth, all God does is grounded in the fact that God is the God of the eternal election of his grace. Does this mean that God is limited by his electing? No... because his election is the primal and basic decision (Ur- und Grundentsheidung) in which God wills to be and actually is God.

There is also an eschatological dimension to Barth's soteriology - there is some emphasis upon a safe and final end at one's intended destination. This "intended destination" is ultimately reconciliation viz. coming into relation with God. Although this may seem to be only a moralizing account of salvation, there is also a strong sense of the patristic teaching that salvation involves the believer being taken up into the life of the triune God i.e. it is also ontological. In this way, it escapes the charge of being 'merely epistemic' salvation and is the firm basis for Barth's later "ethics of reconciliation".

For Barth, Salvation is fulfilment of the covenant he made i.e. ties in closely with his doctrine of election. Reconciliation is, therefore, the history in which God concludes and confirms his covenant with man. Barth's doctrine of election is declared to be the "sum of the gospel". Primarily, it is universal - all men are elected "in Christ" - Christ is the elect one and the electing one. This election takes us to the heart of the being of God - cf. the primal and basic decision (Ur- und Grundentsheidung) in which God wills to be and actually is God. Thus, his desire to elect all men in Christ is constitutive of who God is. Also, Jesus Christ as the one in who all men are elect and by whom all men are elected, is the beginning, middle and end of God's electing and therefore also in his saving action.

It is here that we see the eschatological dimension of Barth's doctrine of salvation - for eschatologically considered, Salvation is the completion of the purpose of election which takes its origin in the very being of God.

The purpose of the cross in this doctrine of reconciliation is vital - it is the substituion of the bearing by God in Christ of God's rejection of human sin i.e. he bears our rejection so that we may be reconciled to him. However, salvation is far broader than this i.e. imperative to this doctrine of salvation is the aspect of resurrection viz. the verdict of God upon the act of obedience by his Son by which he judges the world but with the aim of saving it.

There is also a recapitulation present in Barth's doctrine of salvation i.e. the death of Old Adam, acheivement of the new.

Structurally, Barth orders his doctrine around three moments of the self-same historical happening characterised by the divine act, the human act and the divine human act. In each of these aspects, other traditional Reformed aspects ie. the Person of Christ, the munus triplex, the state/way of Christ. Furthermore, each aspect refernces different approaches to hamartiology. Furthermore, each of the three "moments" of salvation highlight different aspects of the soteriological work of Christ. Each aspect also expresses the work of the Holy Spirit in each case. Eberhard Jungel helpful draws up a pictoral model of KB's doctrine of soteriology in his book Karl Barth: a Theological Legacy p.48-49 which is probably the most clear summary of Barth's approach to salvation.

CD IV/1 deals with the first historical act of Christ - his priestly office munus sacerdotale in which the Judge is judged in our place. Two emphases:

1 - this divine self-giving to death is universal in scope. Cross is the historical outworking of the universal divine will to elect - slaying of Old Adam. Platonic realism - i.e. whole human race perecived as a whole. There is both ACTION and REVELATION going on here. Divine Judge exercises divin judgement by (1) revealing the state of affairs but (2) bringing about another state of affairs. This is an historical act of the eternal God rooted in eternity (eternal election) therefore it has eternal significance for all men.

2 - the human appropriation of what is acheived. God's self-giving humility leads to a judgement of sin as human pride. This self-giving humility of God leads to an overcoming of human pride and thus renders it redundant. In other words, the essence of sin is to stand over one's neighbour in superior position i.e. to ake this position of divine judge over him - play God over others. However, Gods saves us by refusing to be the judge we seeks to be - He Himself goes into the dock - self-humiliation = the history of Jesus - the Judge judged in our place. This removes the necessity for our judgement and liberates us. This is the way of the Son of God in a far country.

Is this a psychologizing account? Yes in that it uses judgment as a metaphor for standing in judgement . However, it is also an ontological conception too. By changing the relationship of man to God, God affects to change human beings. Gunton points to the claim by Melanchthon that salvation is also solo corde - i.e. if pride is sin centred on the heart, by changing the heart, the whole reorientation of human being is affected - thus Barth is in close agreement with the reformation doctrine of reorientation of the person to God by the death of Christ.

However, does this mean that Barth conflates justification and atonement? No - justification is the about of a new status i.e. a movement by divine and judgement from one status to another. This is affected by and through God's pardonpardon. Is this merely imputation? Eschatologicallt pardon spoken in the present. Is justification also universal? Barth distinguishes between UNIVERSAL DIVINE ACT and (possibly particular) HUMAN APPROPRIATION in CD IV/2.

IN this volume, Barth moves from talking of God as Versohner (reconciler) to talking of God as the one who is reconciled in him. This is the second aspect of the one reconciling act - the munus regale - the kingly office. Change from language of the Lord as Servant to the language of Servant as Lord. Elevation of the Royal man. The one who was the OBJECT of the divine work is now the ACTIVE SUBJECT. Note the paralleling of divine and human action.

Dynamic concept of Human Nature in Barth - the human story of Christ is involved with real world events - again like Barth's universal atonement - again a notion of Platonic realism. Christ as human is elevated - exaltation of Christ - we are exalted with him i.e .human essence (wesen) is exalted to true humanity. Judgement bring acquittal but ALSO a genuine universal humanity.h However, although this is ontological - it is also dynamic - it involves a movement or anticipation. Although in Jesus Christ, a Christian has already come into being, in himself he is always in the process of becoming. In other words, Barth is talking about SANCTIFICATION - treated ontologically. The transcendent declaration of pardon in eternity with the immanent conception of participation i.e. a second moment of the one divine act. De jure vs. De facto distinction. Not merely epistemically saved - Barth talks about confession which is being awakened to faith.

CD IV/3 split into two. Adds little more to the previous two volumes. It does emphasise the FINISHED act of reconcilation. It touches on the juxtapositon of the two previous acts (divine and human) in a divine -human act - the mediatorship of Christ. God and man mediating between loving God and lost humankind. largely REVELATION. The Prophetic work of Christ. Not of information - but rather a process or historyu in which man (the WHOLE of man) becomes aware within his history of ANOTHER history from without. Barth talks of the conversion of Saul to PAul and the war waged against sin, death and the devil.

That Path of Truth: A Reading of Summa Theologicae IIIa, q. 46-49

2007-03-01T16:41:00.000Z

“Our Saviour, the Lord Jesus Christ, as he was, according to the Angels’ witness, saving his people from their sins, showed in his own Person that path of truth which, in rising again, we can follow to the blessedness of eternal life.” ST, IIIa, prologue.

Rubric

In seeking to summarise the line of reasoning proposed by Aquinas in ST IIIa, q. 46-49 one is faced with a Sisyphean task. It becomes obvious that to Thomas word order and logical arrangement are paramount to his task. Couple this with his desire for clarity, no doubt linked to the nature of the Summa, and one is left with what is, to all intents, a summary (summa) of the Christian faith which is not in need of further distillation. In view of this, the quaestiones at hand will not be reviewed per se but rather those themes which seem to obtrude the text will be explored so as to further illumine the text.

Necessity

The perennial topic explored by the theologians studied thus far in the course has focused upon the idea of the ‘necessity’ of the Incarnation, suffering and death of Jesus Christ. Thomas is no different but, in placing the discussion of the topic at the outset of his section on the Passion (ST IIIa. q. 46 a. 1), he begins his talk of the Passion with this idea of necessity: “It does not seem necessary that Christ should have had to suffer in order to free mankind.” (ST IIIa. q. 46 a. 1) To start from this idea of necessity is not to open a theological ‘can of worms’ and battle out the old clichéd disputes but is, for Thomas, the establishment of a key theme for the following four questions. In affirming that there must be some idea of necessity at work in the Passion of Christ (citing John 3:14 “as Moses was lifted up in the wilderness, so must the Son of Man be lifted up”) Thomas follows Aristotle in positing many uses of the word ‘necessity’. In contrasting ‘necessity of compulsion’, arising from some efficient or moving cause, with the idea of ‘necessity of a desired end’ (finis dicitur) Thomas can state that there is no necessity bounding God here. God is after all, God. However, an extrinsic cause could induce necessity without which, “the objective either cannot be maintained at all or cannot be otherwise be so well attained.” (ST, IIIa, q. 46, a. 1, resp.) In exploring this further, Thomas highlights three aspects of this necessity, the third of which is vital for the remainder of his work on the Passion:
1 – for our sake; so that we might not perish.
2 – for his sake; so that he might be exalted (of which more later).
3 – for God’s sake; “for his [God’s] decree concerning Christ’s passion as announced in the Scriptures and prefigured in the observances of the Old Testament had to be fulfilled.

‘Fittingness’

Thus, we reach the theme of conveniens or ‘fittingness’. The Passion was necessary in that without it, the goal which Christ chose willingly (e.g., the liberation of humanity), could not have been achieved so convenienter. Does this mean that God could not have saved humanity by some other method? No! In principle, God could have freed humanity from sin without any of the ideas that Thomas goes on to talk about – God is the measure of justice not the one who acquiesces to justice. However, in providing salvation in the way he did, by the satisfactio offered by the Incarnate Christ, God showed the world greater mercy than has he simply offered an effortless reconciliation.

To explain this further, we need to explore the next proposition that Thomas submits: was there a better way to free man than the passion of Christ? (ST, IIIa, q. 46, a. 3) We know that the Passion of Christ was preferable to a simple reconciliation but perhaps there is some more ‘fitting’ way than the Passion to free humanity from sin? In other words, how is fittingness determined? Here Thomas offers the following line: “A means is the more appropriate (convenientior) for the end, as it brings together more assets towards the end.” (ST, IIIa, q. 46, a. 3, resp.) Thus, because of the particular Passion of Christ, “many things having to do with man’s salvation over and above liberation from sin also converged” (ST, IIIa, q. 46, a. 3, resp.) Following this, Thomas gives five such ‘assets’ which can be seen in the text. Thus we see Thomas utilising the methods used by previous patristic and early mediaeval traditions, but in a more highly structured way.

Symbolism

This is seen by his parallel use of symbolism alongside the idea of ‘fittingness’. In the ensuing treatment on the question of why primarily a cross must be used in the Passion of Christ (ST, IIIa, q. 46, a. 4), Thomas cites Gregory of Nyssa: “The form of the Cross radiates out from the centre in four different directions, thus denoting the universal diffusion of power and providence of him who hung upon it.” (In Christi Resurrectionem, 1, P.G. 46, 624) Again, although this instance portrays a ‘cosmic’ symbolism there is also an idea of ‘biblical’ symbolism which pervades Thomas’ thought: “The tree of man’s defeat became his tree of victory; where life was lost, there life had been restored.” (Augustine, Sermo 32 de Passione, P.L. 39, 1808) How do we see the argument for the ‘fittingness’ of the Cross? In so far as, in the cosmic and the biblical symbolism utilised by Thomas, the human mind is imaginatively ‘satisfied’. It is central to the anthropology of Thomas that nothing can be truly known unless it is mediated by some form of sense appearance (cf. ST, Ia, q. 84, a. 7). Thus, in this way also, the Passion of Christ and his death on a cross are argued from a position of ‘fittingness’ – not only some abstract idea of continuity, but also in that it epistemologically (yet concretely) satisfies the human mind.

Torah – the Old Law AND the New

In talking of ‘fittingness’ we have inadvertently stumbled across another key theme in Thomas’ soteriology; the idea of the Old Testament Torah functioning decidedly within any talk of the work of Christ. When talking about the necessity of Christ’s Passion we quoted the following: “his viz. God’s decree concerning Christ’s Passion as announced in the Scriptures and prefigured in the observances of the Old Testament had to be fulfilled.” (ST, IIIa, q. 46. a. 2) Thus, tied into the idea that “veritas enim debet respondere” (reality should correspond to the figure) comes this very concrete aspect to the Passion of Christ of fulfilment of the Torah. Not only on the epistemological level did Christ have to be seen to be fulfilling the figures of the past (i.e. dying on a tree vs. the tree in Eden, etc.) but an actual fulfilment of the law was vital to Thomas’ idea of Christ’s Passion.

This can be seen most helpfully in the 2nd article of the 47th question: in asking whether or not Christ was obedient in his death Thomas emphasizes the notion of fulfilment in Christ’s obedience. “As the Old Law reached its consummation in Jesus’ death, according to the words, It is consummated (John 19:30), uttered by the dying Christ, we may say that he fulfilled by his suffering all the precepts of the Old Law” (ST, IIIa, q. 47, a. 2, resp. 1) Thomas divides the Old Law into three aspects: moral precept (based on the command of charity – to show how much he loved the Father and the world, his neighbours), ceremonial precept (sacrifice – the offering of a sactifactio by Christ), juridical precept (with respect to justice or iustitia – Christ dies for the restoration of right order in humanity).

Matthew Levering, one of the few scholars to actually address Thomas’ theology of the Passion (to its detriment I might add), suggests that each of these precepts corresponds to the three offices of Christ (triplex munus). There is not the space to explore this further, but the best summary of his view can be read in his chapter on ‘The Cross of Christ” in Christ’s Fulfillment of Torah and Temple.

Temple

One final theme which repeatedly finds its way into these few questions is the idea of the Church of Christ and Christ’s mission for the Church in the Passion. Firstly, the strong definition of the Church is constantly repeated and is vital to some of the arguments for the efficacy of the Passion from Christ to man. This is embodied in the idea of the una mystica persona – the one mystical person (ST IIIa, q. 48, a. 2, ad i) It is in this person of Christ that the church find its albeit mysterious and yet actual identity. In understanding this we can see the transfer of merit from Christ the head (caput) onto the various members thus making Christ’s passion efficacious for us. The corollary of this is the strong doctrine of ecclesiology which posits itself from this position. In tandem with this, the sacraments become important as actualizing this mystical union of the Church with God and in the sacraments the church finds its assurance so that centuries later Luther can shout to the devil’s doubts, “Baptizatus sum!”.

The Shape of Christology - John McIntyre

2006-12-19T14:35:00.000Z

Having ploughed my way two-thirds of the way through this book over the weekend, I feel as though I should post some of my thoughts to correlate and review:

Having read McIntyre's other book in this vein (The Shape of Soteriology) and having found it interesting, I decided to read this book as part of my revision regarding Christology. I've enjoyed it.

The book is structured in this way

1 - The idea of Shape in Christology - comprised of three aspects: given, model, method.

a. given - how the given (starting point) is different throughout the Christological discipline and how the given relates to the model.

b. method - method is treated secondly as the method of responding to the given results in the model used.

c. models - how does this all fit together and what are right and wrong ways of formulating models.

2 - Popular models effective in current Christology - three: two-nature, psychological and revelation.

a. two-nature - McIntyre begins by looking at the Aristotelian foundations of the two nature model and seeks to show how this functions throughout the classical formulations and heresies. In his critique he seeks to reschematise the idea of the nature of the humanity and the nature of the divinity.

b. psychological - in critiquing the idea of the nature of humanity in Christ, McIntyre views the Barthian view of humanity against the idea of humanity as portrayed by John-Paul Satre. Opting for the latter, he builds a picture of the humanity of Christ based upon "situational deployment" - based upon the decisions Christ makes as a man. It is from here that he approaches the humanity of Christ in his modern approach to the two-nature model.

c. revelation - in response to this with respect to the divine nature of Christ, McIntyre proposes to view this through the eyes of the revelation model of Christology. McIntyre argues that the renewed interest in the doctrine of revelation has shifted the focus from the thing revealed (God) to the doctrine itself. The divine nature is deployed in terms of "life lived and death died". Thus, McIntyre seeks to explore the model of revelation so as to more fully understand the divine nature of Christ.

Having only read up to the chapter on the Psychological model, I want to put down a few thoughts on his chapter on the two-nature model.

Aristotelian Universals
McIntyre begins by looking at Aristotelian metaphysics and the ontological distinction between prote ousia and deutero ousia. Effectively he results in formulating the Aristotelian ontological form - no physis anhypostatos. From this basis, he argues that he can plot the majority of the classical Christological development. Thus, because of this formula, no physis anhypostatos, Nestorius must question how there can only be one hypostasis and result in stating that there must be two hypostasis (cf. below for my views on the Nestorian controversy). However, this was not a one-way thing because at the opposite extreme we have Eutyches arguing that there were only two natures before the union not after. Again, this is based on the idea that no physis anhypostatos. Thus, we see Eutyches and Nestorius seeking to correct Christology against Aristotelian views on reality.

McIntyre then goes on to view this idea of no physis anhypostatos against the Chalcedonian definition. According to McIntyre, the definition is often read in an "impersonal" way. This is because it affirms that there are two physes but only one hypostasis. How then do we view the physis of the human against the claim no physis anhypostatos?

There are two answers: Leontius of Byzantium and Ephraim of Antioch.

Leontius formulates the idea of enhypostasia - the idea that the human physis finds its hypostasis in the hypostasis of the divine Logos. McIntyre labels some criticisms of this idea before going on to look at Barth's appropriation of enhypostasia. His main problem with this is that Barth favours the idea of the humanum being united with hypostasis of the Logos rather than a homo, an individual man. This is obviously due to his view that man is completely separate from God and he wants to avoid the idea that man is "coredemptive" with God. However, it seems to lose the idea of Jesus being an actual man. (McIntyre: "Barth, I should say, is right in insisting upon the fact that Jesus Christ the humanum exists in the form of an actual man (though how, having said so, he can still believe in Jesus it was not a homo, i.e. a particular man, but humanitas that was united with united with the Logos, is difficult to understand). McIntyre much prefers the idea of Ephraim of Antioch who argues for a confusion of hypostates rather than of physes. Thus you remove the problems avoided by previous christologies but you also remove the idea of an "impersonal" God.

McIntyre ends the chapter in two ways. Asking whether we should abandon the Christologies based upon this often-argued "defunct" ontology. He argues two things: firstly, although post-Kierkegaard we reject the idea of Aristotelian metaphysics, on a practical level, we often talk in a way which suggests we do. Secondly, we can still utilise the models without having to hold on to this outlook on reality. (here I feel he is a little convoluted).

In closing, he says that the two-nature model is useful but only so far as we reschematise the idea of the divine and human natures in Christ. He borrows a lot from Satre here and so looks at a much more existential portrayal of the human nature. I'm interested to see where he goes from here.

Criticisms so far:

1 - McIntyre wants to keep everything. Which is nice. But I think nigh on impossible. He tries to argue that you can hold to many different views of Christology in one all-encompassing view but to me it seems idealistic and also reductionistic in places.

2 - He seems very reliant upon philosophy be it classical or existential and so be aware that some passages are very dense and he doesn't explain much of the philosophy as he goes along.

3 - Very dated. Delivered as a series of lectures in 1965 so bears the inevitable marks of mid-20th C theology/philosophy.

But other than that, thought provoking

What was at stake in the Nestorian Debates? Was it Fair?

2006-11-07T21:29:00.000Z

“What was at stake in the debate between Cyril and Nestorius? Do you consider the condemnation to be fair? Give reasons for your answer.”

When approaching the question of what is held at stake in the Nestorian debates, it is important not to forget the centuries of Christological development that precede them. After three centuries of Christian thought, Christological debate reached a climax in the Ecumenical council of Nicea. Although it offered no solution to the Christological problem, it did, however, offer certain affirmations as orthodox. The council defined that, “the relationship of Jesus Christ to God the Father and any orthodox attempt at solving the problem of Christology must accept as a postulate that Jesus Christ is God in the sense conveyed in this creed” Moreover, although the later council of Constantinople confirmed what had been formulated at Nicea, it submitted a slightly modified version of the creed: the Nicene-Constantinopolitan creed. The Nicene Creed had established that Jesus Christ is God, but had left certain questions unanswered; namely, how can Jesus, being truly God, also exist as a man? Thus, the council of Constantinople put emphasis upon the aspect of the humanity of Jesus.
Yet in this regard, both Nestorius and Cyril could not be more unanimous. Both held to the teaching of both councils, seeing themselves as orthodox and affirming both the humanity and the divinity of Christ. However, the Christological debates had moved on and the problem that Cyril and Nestorius were seeking to resolve involved the configuration of the two postulates of Christology in concord: the humanity and the divinity of Christ. In other words, what was the nature of the union between the divine and the human within the individual Jesus Christ?
Although it may seem innocuous, the catalyst behind the debates referred to just this union, although not as obviously as it might seem. Around the year 430, Nestorius preached a sermon defending a priest who denied the appellation of the term theotokosto the Virgin Mary. Lying beneath this sermon, a Christological concern festered. “In effect the question was whether it is proper to say that the divine Logos was born of a human mother – whether, in short, the Logo is the ultimate subject of the human attributes of Jesus.” This idea that the divine Logos can be the subject of human attributes and the idea that the humanity of Christ can receive the benefits of the Logos was known as the doctrine of communicatio idiomatum – the communication of properties. Thus, for example, the writer of Acts could refer to “the blood of God” (Acts 20:28) even though it is known that it cannot be possible for God to have blood.
Nestorius reacted against this idea of communicatio idiomatum in principle. But why was this so? Nestorius belonged within the school of theology which was known as Antiochene theology. In opposition to those who insinuated the idea of communicatio idiomatum, “it was the question of divine impassibility which took more of the attention of the Antiochenes” . This idea of divine impassibility is vital to the Antiochene soteriology; the Church had so long rejected the pagan gods as possessing human passions and weaknesses, that to suggest that the divine Logos was born, suffered and died was utter paganism. For Nestorius, any communicatio idiomatum was to confuse between the divine and the human natures within the person of Jesus Christ. To do so would result in a tertium quid – an third ‘something’ – neither properly man nor properly God. This is what Nestorius accused Cyril of doing:
You do not confess that he is God in ousia in that you have changed him into the ousia of the flesh, and he is no more a man naturally in that you have made him the ousia of God; and he is not God truly or God by nature, nor yet man truly or man by nature.

Thus, Nestorius had a clear view of the boundaries of Christological formulations of the relationship of the two natures – what it should not look like – and upon this built his idea of what an incarnational union between the two natures should resemble.
This distrust of any ontological union, which inevitably would lead to a confusion of the two natures, meant that Nestorius had to reschematize the traditional model of the incarnational union. In accordance with the traditional model, Nestorius affirmed that there were two natures. However, the existence of a nature implied a substance, and thus each nature possessed a hypostasis and each nature had an ‘external appearance’ or prosopon Thus, for Nestorius, there were two natures, two substances, two hypostases and two prosopa. Any union involving the natures would result in ontological union and so to avoid this, Nestorius does something unparalleled within the Christological debates: he talks of a union of prosopa. Therefore, in his own mind, Nestorius has avoided the creation of a tertium quid whilst still maintaining a union of the natures in Christ.
The idea of prosopon within the Nestorian texts is far from certain. Although it referred to ‘external appearance’ , it also carried with it a notion of will. “To be the prosopon of God means to Nestorius to be the Image of God, and to be the Image of God is first and foremost to will what God wills, to have the will and purpose of God.” Thus, Nestorius writes:
As the image of God, he should have preserved himself for God without blemish or flaw, so that whatever God wills, he should will, because he had the prosopon of God. For the prosopon of God is this: that whatever God wills, he who has the prosopon should will.

Consequently, Nestorius could never formulate anything more than a moral union of the prosopa in Christ, successfully circumnavigating the problems caused by an ontological union and yet offering a union between the humanity and the divinity of Christ.
So where does Nestorius fall foul of Cyril? On the one hand, Nestorius has grasped a knowledge of what problems can beset Christological thought and on the other, he has formulated his own response to these problems. However, for Cyril, the idea of communicatio idiomatum is vital for any form of incarnational union and cannot be brushed aside so easily as Nestorius manages. Thus, Cyril could proclaim:
Whoever does not acknowledge God’s Word as having suffered in the flesh, being crucified in the flesh, tasted death in flesh and been made first-born from the dead because as God he is Life and life-giving shall be anathema.

The problems of neglecting the communicatio idiomatum are two-fold: firstly, as the twelfth anathema states, it is the Son of God who suffers truly as man, and without the communicatio idiomatum resulting from an ontological union, the suffering cannot be experienced truly by God. Cyril is adamant that the phrase ‘the Impassible suffers’ is not incoherent but the heart of the incarnational mystery. Secondly, the communicatio idiomatum ensures that the Son of God experiences true human suffering. For Nestorius, the suffering that the Son of God endures is experienced through the human nature. However, this dilutes the suffering into something less than true human suffering; the Son of God would experience human suffering in a divine manner which is not to truly experience human suffering. Therefore, although Cyril sees the same problems with uniting the divine and human natures in Christ, he cannot brush aside the doctrine of communicatio idiomatum as it is vital to an efficacious Incarnation.
What is at stake in the debates between Nestorius and Cyril? On the surface, not a great amount; Nestorius seems adamant that he does not propose a doctrine of ‘Two Sons’ and is concerned for the unity of the humanity and divinity in Christ. However, Cyril realises that what is at stake is the effectuality of the Incarnation itself. If Nestorius’ model is correct, then Christ cannot fully atone as he is not truly man and God in one person concurrently. To rectify the problem, Cyril had to reschematize the idea of communicatio idiomatum to avoid the problems that Nestorius tried to avoid.
Positively, Cyril grasped and explicitly stated, for the first time, that the attributes were predicated not of the natures, but of the person, for the Incarnation is not the compositional union of the natures but the person of the Son taking on a new manner or mode of existence.

Thus, although the communicatio idiomatum still involved the sharing of the divine and human attributes, they were viewed as being utilized by the person as a unity rather than by natures separately.
However, although the very Incarnation was held at stake in the discussions between Cyril and Nestorius, the question of impartiality remains to be asked: is it right to assume that the condemnation of Nestorius was fair? To approach this issue three further questions must be asked: Was Nestorius a Nestorian? Was Cyril a heretic? And how far did the politics inform the proceedings?
The enquiry into whether Nestorius fell into the trap of the Nestorian heresy has become popular since the discovery of his work, The Bazaar of Heracleides, at the beginning of the twentieth century. In this work, Nestorius argues that he is misunderstood, that he never held to a doctrine of ‘Two Sons’ and was concerned for the unity of Christ. However, this is not without its problems; the book’s date of composition is by no means definite but is generally accepted to have been written around 451 AD – twenty years after his condemnation in 431. Even Anastos, who is perhaps the most staunch defender of Nestorius’ orthodoxy, reminds us that, “it may be, as some object, that the Bazaar represents a Nestorius who had had twenty years since his condemnation in 431 to repent of his errors and make essential emendations.” Nevertheless, even treating the Bazaar as the authoritative text concerning Nestorius’ Christology has revealed shortcomings with his portrayal of the Incarnational union. Nestorius was tentative in using language of unity avoiding the possibility of the humanity and divinity of Christ being lost in the ‘becoming’ process of the Incarnation. However, “a permanently valid doctrine of Christ could only be forthcoming from men who somehow made the unity of His person the ultimate ground for their thought about the duality of His natures, taking their start from what is single, not trying to reduce two compatible concepts to identity.” Thus, though Nestorius could protest his innocence in formulating a doctrine of ‘Two Sons’ and maintain that he sought to explain the unity, his understanding of the union of prosopa within Christ was insufficient and so left him with the original problem – with two natures in one person. Although the stamp of Nestorianism upon his Christology may seem overly harsh, Nestorius did not sufficiently answer the problems he set out to solve. Accordingly, the church councils were right to condemn him as a heretic and on this count, his condemnation was fair.
However, the cries of “heresy!” were not unanimously aimed at Nestorius. Cyril, too, was beset by accusations of heretical doctrine. It would be unfair if Cyril were overlooked at the expense of Nestorius, and that his ruling was upheld in the face of his heresy. Most notably, Cyril was accused of Monophysite tendencies in his Christology, brought about by his insistence that the formula was a vital aspect in Christological thought. For Nestorius and the Antiochene school, Cyril was neglecting the two natures of Christ and was producing a tertium quid. However, is this a fair summation of Cyril’s use of the mia physisformula?
It is important to notice that Cyril’s emphasis falls upon the word mia “Cyril primarily used mia physis to emphasize that Christ is one being or reality – one entity” The Nestorians, and the later Monophysites, misunderstood why Cyril found the mia physisso vital to his Christology. They assumed he referred to a oneness of ‘quiddity’ rather than to highlight the oneness itself. “The comparison is used only to denote the oneness and not the manner of the oneness” Was Cyril suggesting that the two natures in Christ were compacted together so as to be indistinguishable? No! Cyril was concerned to view the two natures of Christ through the one person of Christ and to do this he used the mia physisformula. Again, on this count, the condemnation of Nestorius is fair as Cyril was not a heretic.
Finally, a brief analysis of the politics involved will complete our study on the condemnation of Nestorius. The events surrounding the condemnation of Nestorius were tinged with political power-play, underhand dealings and bad timing. Two councils met simultaneously to discuss the issues; one in favour of Nestorius, one in favour of Cyril. John of Antioch, a supporter of Nestorius, turned his back on his friend after Nestorius was condemned. Cyril had much influence in the proceedings; so much so that Nestorius later lamented:
And I was summoned by Cyril who had assembled the Council, even by Cyril who was the chief thereof. Who was judge? Cyril. And who was the accuser? Cyril. Who was bishop of Rome? Cyril. Cyril was everything.

Thus, it can be seen that the condemnation of Nestorius was not completely fair. Wrong as he may have been, the manner in which the procedures were carried out was unfair. Nestorius was not given a fair trial or a fair chance to present his Christological views. However, the condemnation was justifiable as Nestorius’ view of Christology was heretical and the very efficacy of the incarnation was at stake.

Bibliography:

Anastos, Milton V. ‘Nestorius was Orthodox’ Dumbarton Oaks Papers 16 (1962).

Braaten, Carl. E ‘Modern Interpretations of Nestorius’ Church History 32 (1963).

Chadwick, Henry ‘Eucharist and Christology in the Nestorian Controversy’ Journal of Theological Studies 2.2 (1951).

Chesnut, Roberta A. ‘The Two Prosopa in Nestorius’ Bazaar of Heracleides’ Journal of Theological Studies 29.2 (1978).

Cyril Adversus Nestorii Blasphemias 3 in Library of the Church Fathers (Oxford: James Parker & Co., 1881).

Grillmeier, Aloys Christ in the Christian Tradition, (London: Mowbray; Atlanta, Ga.: John Knox Press, 1975).

Loofs, Friedrich Nestoriana, (Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1905).

Nestorius The Bazaar of Heracleides trans. C.R. Driver and L. Hodgson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1925).

Prestige, G.L. Fathers and Heretics, (London: SPCK, 1968).

Sellers, R.V. Two Ancient Christologies, (London: SPCK for the Church Historical Society, 1940).

Vine, A.R. An Approach to Christology, (London: Independent Press, 1948).

Weinandy, Thomas G. Does God Suffer? (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame, 2000).

Wilkens, Robert L. ‘Tradition, Exegesis and the Christological Controversies’ Church History 34 (1965).

Nestorius and the Controversy which bears his Name

2006-10-21T19:42:00.000+01:00

You'll notice that I've spent some time reading into the Nestorian controversy of the fifth century and the debates with Cyril of Alexandria. I'm still taking my time working out exactly what is going on here but the gist of what I think is as follows:

I'm pretty convinced that the debates pivot around the use of the term θεοτοκος. This goes against the idea (presented in Chadwick's article "Eucharist and Christology in the Nestorian Controversy" in JTS, Vol. 2, 1951) that the θεοτοκος debates were actually closed at the time of the Nestorian controversy and were reopened in a majesterial political venture by Cyril to besmirch the name of Nestorius and recentralise Alexandria as the more prominent church centre. Be this as it may, I do not think the political emphasis should be ignored. Nestorius was not the first proponent in the attack against the nomenclature of Mary as θεοτοκος. Nestorius suggests that the debate was raging before he arrived in Constantinople: "When I came here, I found a dispute among the members of the church, some of whom were calling the Blessed Virgin Mother of God, while others were calling her Mother of man. Gathering both parties together, I suggested that she should be called Mother of Christ, a term which represented both God and man, as it is used in the gospels." (Loofs, Nestoriana, 185) Thus, to single out Nestorius in particular, rather than other more extreme opponents seems harsh. Schwartz notes that, "Nestorius in his sermons put forwards no innovations, but the doctrine which had been taught by Diodore of Tarsus and Theodore of Mopsuestia for almost two generations without being suspected of heresy" (Schwartz, Cyril and the Monk Victor, 1). In effect, it appears that Cyril reacts against the Antiochene approach of Christology, something he has never sought before in any real capacity, and so this argument seems to be a means to an end.

Be that as it may, the approach of Cyril in his 'Commentary on St. John', which is generally affirmed to precede the Nestorian Controversy bears the hints of his later feuds with Nestorius, and so it seems fair that the politics weren't the main emphasis in the debates. (Thus, Chadwick, on the Commentary on St. John, "We find frequent castigation of the notion that there are two Sons or two prosopa" in JTS, 152)

The majority of scholarship, therefore, (whether sympathetic to Nestorius or not) sees this argument over the word θεοτοκος as being a prominent part in the subsequent controversy cf. Grillmeier, Christ in Christian Tradition, 448 and Relton, A Study in Christology (one on each side of the debate). Weinandy argues that the reason this debate over θεοτοκος proved so instrumental was deeper than just an argument about nomenclature. Rather, what is at the heart of the debate is the communicatio idiomatum. The reason why Nestorius did not like the term θεοτοκος was because it impinged upon his high view of the impassibility of God. That is not to say that Cyril did not hold that God is impassible, but rather that Nestorius could not align a view of divine impassibility alongside the idea of the communicatio idiomatum.

To call someone the Mother (lit. 'bearer) of God, was for Nestorius to in some ways confuse the relationship between the persons of Christ. God was impassible, therefore any suffering or experience of humanity had to be done by the humanity of Christ. Thus, the idea of communicatio idiomatum was improper as it lead to the passibility of God. Any suffering in the life of Christ HAD to be experienced by the human part of Christ else God would not be God.

The removal of the communicatio idiomatum meant that Nestorius had to remove any ontological relationship between the two persons in the person of Christ. For Nestorius, any ontological union would result in a tertium quid - a mixture of man and God that was effectually neither man or God. The question that this inevitably lead to was "How then can the relationship between the Logos and the humanity be conceived so that there is a union?" For if Nestorius could not answer this question, then he would be left with very separate persons within Christ - God and man.

To answer this, Nestorius reformulated the approach to the formulation of the ingredients in tradition Christology. For Nestorius, borrowing from the Antiochene tradition, everything has an ousia - this is the 'stuff' that things are made of i.e. 'the idea of a horse' - and each ousia has a physis - this is the actual concrete representation of a thing i.e. an individual 'horse' - however, Nestorius introduced the idea of a prosopon here - every physis had a prosopon. Definition of Nesorius' view of prosopon is ambiguous, but the idea of appearance is generally accepted. So although a horse has a physis, what is seen by us of this horse is its prosopon. Any relationship, for Nestorius, takes place between the prosopa RATHER than the physis. Thus, there isn't an actual ontological relationship between natures, but a spiritul relationship of prosopa. This results in a prosopon (here usually translated "person" who is Christ). Weinandy describes this common prosopon as "a phenomenological interplay between the divine and the human qualities" (179) All that Nestorius could conceive of in the end was a moral union between the divinity and the humanity and this was the result of removing the idea of communicatio idiomatum.

Where do the faults lie here? 1 - if there is no ontological union between man and God in Christ, who is it that suffers? the humanity of Christ... Therefore, how has Christ taken up the suffering of man? He hasn't. 2 - if Christ takes up suffering in his humanity, then God would not be experiencing human suffering in an authentic way. However, the Incarnation demands that the Son of God suffer AS A MAN. Thus, the Incarnation falls short!

So, by arguing as Nestorius does, the removal of the communicatio idiomatum ultimately reduces the Incarnation into something which is soteriologically insufficient.

The beauty of Cyril's theology is that he marries these two problems beautifully (and here I'm following Weinandy's argument almost completely) - how can we maintain the communicatio idiomatum without resulting in an ontological smashing of the two natures of Christ into atertium quid?

For Cyril, to utilize a communicatio idiomatum meant that Christ had to be one - only in this way could divine and human natures be predicated of him. Also, the reality of Jesus must be one with the Son who was homoousious with the Father. Thus, Jesus is one entity and the one entity is the one Son existing as man. Thus, for Cyril, the relationship between God and man could be described as "according to the hypostasis". Rather than the previous ideas of "according to the physis".

Three things result - there is a distinction between the person and the person's manner of existence - the 'becoming' is not a confusion but the Word taking on a new manner of existence - he has validated the communicatio idiomatum. Jesus is the person of the Son existing as a man.

By Cyril's method, the relationship allows the Impassible to suffer in the person of Jesus Christ who is the Son existing as a man. This allows suffering to be taken upon a God who is impassible, and thus, redemption is possible. The communicatio idiomatum can function without reducing down the natures as it no longer refers to the natures as separate but the person as an entity or unity.

However, the question still remains "Was Nestorius treated fairly in light of the Nestorian controversy?" I think that there are three ways of looking at this question 1 - politically 2 - was Nestorius a Nestorian? 3 - was Cyril also heretical?

1 - politically, and this is a matter of least interest, Nestorius was treated unfairly on one level. The evidence shows a concern for political power rather than doctrinal "rightness" so regardless of whether or not Nestorius was wrong, on one level this was not important in the controversy. I believe that Nestorius was mistaken, however, I believe he was treated "unfairly" in the manner of his condemnation.

2 - The standard definition of Nestorianism is that there are two persons in Christ and although they are so close as to be indistinguishable, there is no real union. Is this fair? As far as Nestorius' writings are concerned, No! He cannot emphasise enough his disagreement with this claim. What more can he do? As far as the claim that "logically" Nestorius has to affirm that there are two sons is concerned, I also think is unfair. However badly it is conceived, I believe Nestorius was seeing the problems of communicatio idiomatum alongside impassibility. He seeks to argue towards a union and yet fails. However, the very fact that he seeks to reach this 'union' shows that he is not "Nestorian", merely mistaken. As far as naming the heresy of Two Sons and no "real" union between human and divine nature after Nestorius, again I feel as though he has been treated unfairly.

3 - some argue that Cyril himself was heretical and held monophysite tendencies. I believe this is false (again relying on Weinandy who argues that Cyril uses a soul-body analogy rather than model to use the "mia physis" formula to argue for ONEness rather than for the MANNER of the oneness of Christ) but should one disagree in this respect, it could be argued that it is unfair that Cyril get off "Scott free" rather than monophysitism being named "Cyrillianism".

In conclusion, I think Nestorius was treated unfairly yes. However, I believe that he was patently wrong as far as his Christology and the resulting soteriology are concerned. How then can I feel sympathy for Nestorius? Because he saw the problems in Christology that seldom few saw and he sought to answer them as far as he could. However, in his condemnation, he was misunderstood and, to a great extent, the reasons for his claims being anathematised were not formulated until much after his excommunication. Although he was wrong and the church could see that, it was not until 20 years later that they understood WHY he was wrong, and it took the genius of Cyril to come to terms with that.

Nestorius Reconsidered - H.E.W. Turner

2006-10-20T11:24:00.000+01:00

from Studia Patristica vol. 13, 1975, p.307-321

Turner simply gives a simple overview of the (then) current (although still influential) scholarship on Nestorius: Loofs, Hodgson, Scipioni and Grillmeier - all important names in the vindication of Nestorius.

Turner begins with an (overly?) lengthy discussion of the composition of the Bazaar of Heracleides and concludes that "Abramowski's theory of double authorship appears probable and will be followed here" (308) [as an aside, for an alternate view on the holistic nature of the text, dig out Roberta Chesnut in JTS, vol. 29 if memory serves me correctly - the title is along the lines of The Two Prosopa in the Bazaar of Heracleides and begins with a helpful alternative]

Four general points can be gleaned from the [original] Bazaar:

1 - Nestorius believe in his own orthodoxy
2 - Nestorius claims to provide satisfactorialy for the unity of the Person of Christ
3 - Nestorius exhibits a polemic against the Apollinarians - among whom he places Cyril
4 - Nestorius remains firmly within the Antiochene Dualist tradition, regardless of his strong emphasis in the unity of Christ

Two points must be made about patristic Christology:

1 - The modern philosophical concept of personality has no direct equivalent in Greek thought. Closest we come is the idea of perichoresis in Cappadocian theology.
2 - The placing of the 'will' within the categories most commonly used is a matter of dispute. The question is evaded at Chalcedon but Nestorius uses it in his Christology.

Loofs

* It is wrong to look for any metaphysics in Nestorius' theory of the prosopic union.

* To understand N's Christology, all thoughts of an ontological union must be dismissd

* Is this unity of the two natures intellegible? NO! if you start from the side of God the Word and man.

* However, if you remove any ideas of substance from the equation, the result is "a unity on the spiritual plane - a reciprocity of two personal actions in a relation of giving and taking which becomes so close that the one presents himself as the other and the other as the one" (311)

* This προσωπον is an 'external undivided appearance'.

Criticisms

* Hodgson complains that there is a difficulty in understanding Loofs interpretation.

* This preconceives the doctrine of Martin Khaler, Ritschlian and contemporary of Loofs! Therefore, anachronistic.

* Can any Greek christologian of the fourth/fifth century remove all talk of metaphysics? Is not N's use of προσωπον metaphysical?

* Loofs has no explanation for the communicatio idiomatum which the προσωπον also involves.

* The most damning criticism comes from the text of the Bazaar itself - "By his theory of prosopic union and as a counterblast to Cyril's rival system of ontology he seeks to provide a different but equally metaphysical theory to undergird these facts" (312(

Hodgson

* Hodgson tries to 'reontologise' N's Christology. "For all his emphasis upon will the Christology of N implies a metaphysical analysis, parallel to, though widely different from, that adopted by Cyril" (313)

* Threefold stratification viewed as three concentric cirlces. 'ousia' or 'hypostasis' as the inner core of essence or substance. Then there is the 'physis'
or 'nature' - "what?" question. Finally, the prosopon, the 'external, undivided appearance, appearance not contrasted with but included in reality.

* "Thus the three terms connote respectively concrete essence, nature and appearance and all are needed for the complete definition of an entity" (313)

* There are two ousiai and two physeis but each of these has it's respective prosopa and these combine to form a reciprocity of prosopon in a process of giving and taking.

* This would clear N of the Two Sons heresy but not with the charge of proposing a less than adequate presentation of the unity of God.

Criticisms

1 - Nestorius does use 'ousia' and 'physis', particularly in technical lists, but sometimes he uses them interchangeably.
2 - Hodsons view fails completely to provide for the property content of the prosopa whch extends to the ethical life. On his interpretation this should belong to the 'physis' and not to the prosopon at all.

* Therefore, for all its merits, Hodgson, although improving Loofs interpretation, still over-simplifies.

Scipioni

* Textual issues - disagree with Abramowski - accepts unity of Treatise.

* Sees Stoicism as the clue through the labyrinth - used with caution. Neither the text nor historians (Socrates) suggest N was a master logician.

* Certain terms, important to one or the other, are not shared between the two i.e. prosopon - although some are.

* The axiom of N that man and God are antithetical ousiai goes against the materialistic pantheism of the Stoics. This reflects rather Aristotelianism in N's preference for the concrete.

* Scipioni tries to correlate the metaphysical mapwork of the Stoics into Nestorius.

Criticisms

* Oggioni - the logical leap involved in the mutuality or reciprocity of prosopa and the unsupported equation of prosopon and person.

Grillmeier

* Grillmeier agrees with both Abramowski and Scipioni but he introduces the Cappadocians as the Stoic influences upon N. Thus, the idea of perichoresis is a rudimentary form of the prosopic union.

* reciprocity of prosopa is absent from Antiochene thinkers and the Nesoriana fragments.

* Clearly N aims at providing as solid an ontological basis of union as was compatible with his rigorous diagnosis of duality but was he over-optimistic in believing his success?

* If we affirm either the analogy of perichoresis (Grillmeier) or the ideas adopted from Stoicism (Scipioni) then where does this leave us?

* N should reject all talks of models - however, he creates his own dubious model

Conclusion

* Was Nestorius a Nestorian?

* His final theory complexifies the problem without notably clarifying it.

* "If the theory of the prosopic union cannot do for Nestorius all that he claimed for it, then the charges brought against him in antiquity cannot easily be dismissed" (321)

The Impassible Suffers - Weinandy on Incarnation

2006-10-19T19:34:00.000+01:00

* Suffering is at the heart of redemption - it is through redemption that the mystery of human suffering is transformed and granted a new and rational significance.

* Contemporary theologians have focused so much on a God who suffers within his divine nature that they have neglected the christological and the soteriological import of Jesus' suffering.

The Incarnation and the Communication of Idioms

Three Truths:

1 - It is truly God the Son who is man
2 - It is truly man that the Son of God is
3 - The Son of God truly is man
Thus - Jesus is one ontological entity, and the one ontological entity that Jesus is is the one person of the divine Son of God existing as a complete and authentic man.

* Communicatio idiomatum - formative of this doctrinal development. Every christological heresy found the use of the communcatio idiomatum to be a scandal and an assualt upon reason/theology. Yet it was ultimately the undoing of every heresy.

* Thus, the whole of orthodox patristic theology can be seen as an attempt to defend the practice and to clarify the use of the communicatio idiomatum.

* Why? Because the three truths (cf. above) are contained and articulated - it is truly the Son of God who truly is man and so suffers truly as man.

Nestorius and the Communication of Idioms

* Nestorius and Cyril were agreed on essentials i.e. fully divinity/ full humanity &c.

* Nestorius fully desired to maintain the full and complete integrity of human nature.

* However, realised the danger of 'becoming' - wanted to prevent formation of a tertium quid.

* To say that the Son of God was θεοτοκος, or that the Son of God suffered and died not only meant that the Son of God changed in becoming man, through mixture and confusion, but that he, as divine, was also susceptible to human weakness.

* He has a concern for the complete impassibility of divine nature. Therefore, understanding what the Incarnation is NOT.

* Affirms a common προσωπον of union - so close was their relationship they gave off one common appearance. This προσωπον is merely empirical or phenomenological.

* However, this does not result in an ontological union between the two natures, therefore, how can the Son of God truly become and be man?

* Nestorius does not allow for Son of God actually to exist as man BECAUSE he refused to support the traditional view of communication idiomatum.

Nestorius's Problem

* Starting point flawed - knows the humanity of Christ does not exist prior to its being joined to the divinity. However, he imagines both the divine nature and human nature not only distinct but as seperate prior to the union - ontologically.

* However, because he had already conceived of them separately, he could not conceive of the 'becoming' without the formation of a tertium quid.

*All that is possible for Nestorius is a moral union between divinity and humanity.

Cyril of Alexandria and the Communication of Idioms

* Ardent defence of the communicatio idiomatum.

The Soul-Body Model and the Incarnation

* Importance of the Soul-Body relationship in understanding the relationship between two natures.

* Firstly - the use of it by analogy - this is the right way.

* Secondly - the use of it as a model - this way leads to difficulties. This is because the manner and mode of their respective ontological unions differ in kind. There is the formation of a tertium quid.

* Also, there is a one-to-one correllation between the communication of attributes between the two natures. Either the divinity is diminished or the humanity mutated.

* This replacement of analogy by model is the cause of all christological misconceptions and heresies in the patristic period.

* Examples e.g. Apollinarius, Cappadocians, Eutyches, Luther, Antiochenes, Nestorius (although he later rejects), Calvin, Morris and Swinburne.

The Communcation of Idioms and the Oneness of Christ

* Cyril conceives of the Communicatio Idiomatum in a completely different way.

* "The hermeneutical key for unlocking Cyril's christology is the communcations of idioms for it is the very same key that he himself employed to unlock the mystery of the Incarnation" (190)

Two ways that the communicatio idiomatum demanded that Christ be one:

1 - it demanded that Jesus be one existing reality or entity - thus human and divine properties could be authentically predicated of him.
2 - the one existential reality of Jesus must be the one and same divine Son of God existing as incarnate - as man.

The Mia Physis Formula

* These two ways are to be viewed in the mia physis formula.

* When using this formula, Cyril is referring to one entity rather than one quiddity.

* This results from Cyril's analogous use of the soul-body relationship. When it says "one out of two" it is not inferring a teritum quid. This idea of oneness of Christ from the communicatio idiomatum.

1 - in the gospel, there is one subject, Christ.
2 - the reason there is one person is that the humanity and divinity are united in one person to form the one entity of Jesus similar to the soul-body relationship.

* The comparison is used to denote the oneness NOT the manner of the oneness.

* The only reason Cyril wants to use the analogy of soul-body is for the sake of oneness.

* Cyril uses the word physis in two ways - in the way mention above - and also to refer to the divinity and the humanity as physis in the sense of quiddity.

* So Cyril affirms the mia physis to affirm the communicatio idiomatum.

* Two ideas - the notion of the one entity/subject/person AND the manner of the one subject's existence.

* The one entity of Christ is none other than the one divine person/subject of the Son existing as incarnate.

Becoming as Personal/Existential

* Thus, Cyril can affirm the true nature of the incarnational 'becoming' and the subsequent union between the Son/Word of God and his humanity.

* The incarnational 'becoming' and ensuing union is 'according to the person'.

* This is the christological breakthrough of Cyril - "We affirm this: that the Word personally united to himself flesh.

1 - distinguished between the person (who) and the person's nature (the manner of who's existence)
2 - clarified the 'becoming' - not a mixture, but "the person of the Word taking on a new mode or manner of existence - as man.
2 - validated the communication of idioms.

* Incarnation remains a mystery, but Cyril has clarified more exactly what the mystery is. Leo's Tome and Definition clarify the remaining ambiguities.

* "To read the Chalcedonian Creed except through the eyes of Cyril is to misread it."

* Communication of Idiom gave rise to a proper understanding of the Incarnation. He who is truly God actually lives an authentic human lfe without ceasing to be truly God.

The Communication of Idioms and the Suffering of God

* There was no proper theological rationale for the use of the Communicatio Idiomatum - Cyril provides this in two ways:

1 - negatively - human properties not predicated of the divine nature and vice-versa i.e. no confusing or mixing.
2 - positively - attribute predicated not of the nature but of the person - the person taking on a new mode of existence.

The full impact of the Communicatio Idiomatum:

1 - The Son of God truly experiences the authentic, genuine and undiminished reality of human suffering. The fully divine Son of God DID have to suffer and die - this is what Nestorius wanted to deny.
2 - ensures that it is truly human suffering that the Son of God endures - if the Son of God merely experienced suffering in his divine nature, then it would not genuinely be human suffering.